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Fidesz has been the dominant party in Hungary in recent years and secured a ‘supermajority’ of two-thirds of MPs in
the Hungarian parliamentary elections in 2014. However, as Andrea L. P. Pirro writes, the party’s position has
come under threat of late, with a by-election loss earlier in the year removing the supermajority, while another by-
election on 12 April was won by a representative from the far-right Jobbik party. He argues that while the era of
Fidesz dominance is far from over, the rise of Jobbik poses a challenge for the country’s Prime Minister, Viktor
Orbán.
The victory of the far-right Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) in a by-election in the Tapolca-Ajka-Sümeg
district on 12 April left observers of Hungarian politics simultaneously shocked and unsurprised. The Tapolca by-
election garnered considerable attention due to the (now-old and over-abused narrative of the) ‘rise and rise’ of the
far right in Europe in general, and Hungary in particular. There were high stakes with the elections in this district of
western Hungary, and Hungarian parties and public opinion seemed very much aware of that.
The dominant force in Hungarian politics in recent years has been the national conservative Fidesz, led by the
country’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. In the latest parliamentary elections in April 2014, Fidesz, alongside the
Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) that it formally sits in coalition with, won its second consecutive term in
government with 45 per cent of the votes – enough to grant Orbán and his allies a two-thirds ‘supermajority’ in the
National Assembly.
Unity, a short-lived coalition of the left, scored 25.7 per cent of votes, while Jobbik reported its best result to date
with just over 20 per cent. In essence, the by-election was a test for the ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition (which had
recently lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament following another by-election in the Veszprém district), but also for
the far right’s popularity and the future of the parties on the left.
Jobbik: the chink in Fidesz’s armour?
The by-election took place following the death of the Fidesz MP Jenő Lasztovicza in January this year. From the
outset, the competition appeared limited to two candidates, Zoltán Fenyvesi (Fidesz) and Lajos Rig (Jobbik). Jobbik
stood a chance as the mayor of Tapolca is a member of the party and Rig won a seat in Tapolca’s municipal council
in October 2014.
Apart from this apparent advantage, Jobbik has also started to pose a threat to Fidesz in its own territory. Therefore,
the victory of Rig (35.5 per cent) against Fenyvesi (34.4 per cent) by a provisional margin of 261 votes (a small
number of ballots still have to be counted) suggests that the far-right has managed to extend its sphere of inﬂuence
while attracting and mobilising new voters. Figure 1 shows the full results and how they diﬀer from the 2014
parliamentary elections.
Figure 1: Comparison of election results in Tapolca in the national election (April 2014) and by-election
(April 2015)
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Still, what bolstered Jobbik’s chances was a combination of internal and external factors. In line with a strategy of
‘detoxiﬁcation’, the far right party has toned down much of its uncompromising rhetoric in the last couple of years.
Jobbik accordingly adopted a much friendlier guise and made skilful use of the media to deliver hopeful and
captivating slogans (notably ‘the future can’t be stopped’). This has struck a chord among the moderate electorate
that had once deemed the party too radical; at the same time, it has reinforced Jobbik’s support among the young
and the party is now ﬁrmly placed as the most popular among those aged below 30.
Nevertheless, the party has not changed its brand, but simply repackaged it – as made clear by one of the party
leaders, Márton Gyöngyösi when commenting on the election. The party has successfully managed to reinvent itself
many times, while still remaining true to itself. This strategy has held for the radical Christian and anti-globalist
stances it adopted in the early period of the party’s development; the anti-Roma and ﬁerce anti-establishment
rhetoric that initially raised the party’s proﬁle; and a renewed anti-EU discourse. But, more crucially, it is also true in
relation to the social breadth of its economic platform, which it has intelligently sought to emphasise of late.
In fact, none of these themes has disappeared from Jobbik’s platform – only the degree to which diﬀerent elements
are emphasised has changed. The party, which has until recently spoken only to a (radical) portion of voters, has
strenuously sought to present itself as a credible governing alternative, and is now successfully expanding its pool of
voters to disaﬀected Fidesz supporters. Simply put, the party’s leader, Gábor Vona, now wants to present Jobbik as
a ‘people’s party’ and the Tapolca by-election has brought home the ﬁrst results of this strategy.
A changing political context within Hungary
While Jobbik’s strategy explains some of its success, there is only so much that the party can do to master its own
fortunes; the rest evidently depends on the political context within Hungary – and, in particular, on the actions of
Fidesz. Ultimately, Fidesz has directly/indirectly contributed to the consolidation and rise of Jobbik.
First, Orbán has made some critical missteps during the last year in government. Examples include his attempt to
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introduce an internet tax (promptly cancelled after mass protests), which gave a ﬁrst blow to the popularity of the
Hungarian government, as shown in Figure 2. They also include allegations of corruption and a sequence of
brokerage scandals, from which none of the established parties ever seems to be immune. The Sunday closing of
retail stores was also met with a lukewarm reception (to say the least) from the majority of Hungarians.
Figure 2: Support for Fidesz-KDNP among eligible voters (click to enlarge)
Note: Figures are from May 2010 until March 2015
Second, while in government, Fidesz has ﬂirted with Jobbik’s ‘nativism’ and systematically co-opted part of its policy
agenda. By doing so, Fidesz has mainstreamed Jobbik and paved the way for its success. At the same time, Orbán
has also moved further away from the centre of the political spectrum. In addition, through its cosmetic moderation,
the far right has outﬂanked Fidesz. Now that the two parties come across as two faces of the same coin (nativist
politics), Jobbik has the comparative advantage of representing the untainted and anti-establishment side of it.
While Jobbik’s initial fortunes have been carefully and independently crafted, the party’s recent success is a function
of Fidesz’s political miscalculations. The strategy of demonising the far right, while co-opting its policies, has clearly
backﬁred. Fidesz is simultaneously losing consensus due to unpopular decisions and the merit of Jobbik rests in
having patiently waited to take advantage.
Whether Jobbik will be able to sustain this performance until the 2018 elections is unclear, but having broken the
‘glass ceiling’ its success or failure may no longer depend on Fidesz’s counter-strategies. Be that as it may, these
are not Fidesz-KDNP’s last days; in fact, the coalition still has ample room for manoeuvre. What is clearer now is
that Orbán may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to dismantle the liberal democratic makeup of the country and follow an all-out illiberal
trajectory without a supermajority in Parliament – unless, of course, such a trajectory is supported by Jobbik MPs.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European People’s Party (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
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